As Coalition forces mass outside of Baghdad, what lies ahead is a specialized form of warfare which Sun-Tzu cautioned against over 2500 years ago. “The worst policy is to attack cities,” he wrote. With Saddam’s regime pulling us toward what has been called a “hornet’s nest,” there is no avoiding the battle that lies ahead.

Urbanized Terrain Cannot Be Avoided

Fighting within cities is known as Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). The definition of urbanized terrain is specific to the military and, in short, consists of terrain which has been altered by man-made structures. Obviously, there is a significant difference in planning a MOUT for, say, a 10-hut village in the middle of a 50-mile desert and planning operations in a densely populated area like Baghdad.

MOUTs are not natural fighting patterns for our forces. The military’s habitat is the natural environment of mountains, jungles, deserts, woodlands and the artic. This is the arena for which an army is equipped and trained, and which it prefers. Although these areas have dramatic geographical and climatological differences, they share one thing in common: they are static enviroments for which military planners can account.

The urban environment offers no such static aspects for planning. This type of environment is a human one, making it dynamic and reactive to an offensive force. Thus, although the military has fought enemies in urbanized terrain since its inception, the conventional approach has been to avoid such settings.

In Iraq, there is no avoiding the cities. Baghdad represents a very important tactical goal. Standing as the Iraqi cultural, political and economic center, the loss of Baghdad would inflict a powerful blow at Saddam and the Republican Guard’s morale, warpower and ability to govern. Certainly, obtaining control of a capital like Baghdad does not guarantee victory, as Napoleon learned in his battle for Moscow. It does, however, greatly increase the likelihood of a swift conclusion to the war.

Ground Force Considerations in MOUT

MOUT by nature relies on ground forces which, in turn, rely on efficient ground-maneuver potential. In this context, precision technology is needed to reduce the amount of urban rubble that could impede force movement. Regardless of the density of the urbanized area, these ground forces will face four main challenges:

1. Urban populations contribute to the confusion of battle as civilians flee.
2. The urban setting increases the probability of collateral damage, while forces attempting to minimize such damage place themselves at risk.
3. Forces can become isolated from each other and from command in an urbanized setting, leading to asynchronous operations, ineffective combat and greater risk for friendly fire casualties.
4. Enemy echelons in an urbanized setting have the benefit of multiple points from which to attack or defend, numerous avenues of clandestine approach and a source of supplies, including civilian support. The military learned many lessons in Grozny and Ho Chi Minh, particularly that an enemy with strong supply lines and a dedication to his cause can match and even best a force with superior fire power but inadequate supplies.

Urban Warfare Realities

Urbanized wars are savage and bloody. This is a fact that must be acknowledged not only by the forces engaged in it, but by the public which is now watching combat often as it happens, and which may be unprepared for heated close combat where beliefs, morals, and methods may be challenged in unexpected ways.

The intense monitoring of this war adds another layer of complication. Frankly put, the most effective weapons are not “politically correct,” and using “politically correct” puts our forces at somewhat of a disadvantage. US forces simply do not enjoy the technological advantage in an urban environment that they enjoy elsewhere, largely due to our committment to follow recognized principles of combat and international law.

Saddam’s Republican Guards and Feyadeen are not going to operate under these kind of constraints. As one analyst for the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) notes:

The enemy can use whatever ruthless means he has at his fingertips to engage our forces, yet due to the prevailing attitude with its image, the press, and concern for the local population, the Army may be prevented from using its most effective weapons. In an historical example (Aachen), the use of 155-mm artillery in direct fire mode offered a tremendous equalizer, yet today, it would create unacceptable collateral damage.

Another weapon consistently used in city combat is the flame-thrower. When faced with a bunker or basement where all the firepower in the world is available yet not effective, it has historically been the flame-thrower that got the job done. This weapon, like no other, produces a tremendous amount of psychological effect on a trapped enemy, yet this weapon is not considered an acceptable substitute for firepower.

One of the “ruthless means” that Saddam is likely to employ is the use of NBC operations. (See, Primer: Chemical Weapons and Field Response.) Since the Iraqi forces know themselves to be technologically inferior to Coalition forces, they may attempt to overcome our advantages in combat and conventional weapons by resorting to extreme measures, most likely chemical agents.

CALL acknowledges that chemical weapons would level the playing ground with little effort on Iraq’s part. From Saddam’s standpoint, the easiest way to extract his forces from “no-win” situations is the employment of offensive chemical agents which allow his army to withdraw and fight again elsewhere. Then, too, he may opt to employ chemical weapons at the cost of his own forces to inflict catastrophic losses on the Coalition, particularly if they are committed to a fight in a single building and can be eliminated in large numbers by the deployment of chemical weapons.

Basic Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in MOUT

Forces operate in the urban environment only when the mission dictates it. Even then, the goal is to spend as little time in the urban environment as possible with due consideration to threats and obstacles present. Force safety under these conditions requires unpredictable and alternate routes chosen with advance planning.

The goal is for the entering force to have minimal “signature.” That is, to maintain operational security throughout the planning and execution stage. This depends upon obtaining the most current information possible about the urban terrain, including new hazards, enemy presence, forecasted weather and potential contingent obstacles.

One method of acquiring such information is by establishing effective communication with all friendly units and ensuring ongoing communications with the ground maneuver elements so that both may be used in line with the commander’s objective and actions coordinated appropriately.

Most of all, intelligence preparation of the battlefield requires thinking “outside of the box” to contemplate approaches dramatically different from the conventional battlefield. In urban environments, for instance, the smaller forces of squad and platoons are emphasized along with low-tech systems and short-range anti-tank weapons.

Tactical planning must also take into account the physical impact of urban layout structures on the implementation of operational plans. In terms of layout, most cities have various zones within their city limits: dense residential, random construction, high rise, and industrial zones, for example.

Street patterns typically vary between zones, and operational planning must take these variations into account in the selection of alternate ingress and egress routes. Downtown urban areas, for instance, are typically built on a grid design and therefore travel within the downtown core is efficient and predictable. Suburban residential areas and construction-heavy zones are often composed of sprawling, haphazard streets which create unpredictable passage. In these areas, good intelligence information is crucial to planning varying routes in and out of the areas of engagement.

The industrial zone is the primary location of lines of communication, such as railways, which allow rapid entry and withdrawal from a city. These lines are are therefore a primary target of operations. Most major transportation systems like highways and railroads are built on areas that are impractical for off-road vehicular use. They are therefore easily blocked, a move which can effectively cut off enemy supply lines into and across the city.

Mobility Planning

MOUT mobility planning involves air, building, street, and subterranean corridors of access with battle complexity increasing with the number of corridors that must be considered.

Air access, for instance, can be used both by friendly and enemy forces for insertion and extraction of troops as well as targeting and observation. Aviation intelligence is less concerned with street patterns than with light towers, signs and cables, all of which affect air approach.

Planning against threats at the building level must take into consideration all the possible positions in which enemy units could be laying in wait from one level above the street to the roof of the tallest skyscraper. Buildings can cover or conceal enemy forces while also affecting the field of fire. Taller structures are ideal locations for anti-aircraft weapons and snipers, and the placement of buildings can restrict or block the ground maneuverability.

At the street level, the threats are posed primarily by enemy units moving on avenues of approach. Highways, sidewalks and alleys are considered part of street level mobility, and can provide the means for rapid movement into, out of or across the urban environment. However, where buildings channel ground movement and leave little room for off-road maneuvering, the street level can be effectively blocked by placement of obstacles.

The subterranean mobility corridor consists of underground passageways like sewers, fiber-optic or utility channels and cellar systems which are easily forgotten but which can have a dramatic effect on MOUT outcome. Quite often, they exist as a “city underneath a city,” as Baghdad has been called. Both sides in a conflict can use these avenues to circumvent the enemy and approach from behind.

Movement Through the City

For the Iraqis, winning the battle of Baghdad requires making the fight as unfair as possible in the first place. Already, we are at a disadvantage in our lack of adequate maps. Granted, aerial surveillance can provide a basic sense of the urban layout, it is no substitute for 3-D imaging. Even GPS positioning, with its networked and overlapping systems that are accurate within 1/2 of a meter, can’t truly provide us with information to know how building layouts will pose specific threats. Knowing this, Iraq’s forces will defend from buildings that provide them cover and concealment while granting a field of fire that offers the Coalition forces no cover at all.

The majority of casualties in MOUT occur outside of buildings. Buildings must be isolated to begin with, which means closing them off so other Iraqi units can’t supply or reinforce the defenders within. This is easier said than done, since street-level forces must take into consideration the ability of other Iraqi units to observe their movement and open fire.

Once isolated, the Coalition must obtain a foothold in the building by selecting a point of entry, preferably one which does not involve crossing an open area. At this level, the majority of casualties are caused by mines or booby-traps, small arm direct fire, and indirect fire (e.g., 82mm mortars).

After entry, the building must then be cleared methodically, the ease of which will depend on whether the Iraqi units within have low morale and surrender, whether they withdraw to fight from another location, or whether they rregard the location as key terrain and are willing to fight to the end for it. During this process, the Iraqi forces within the building will be forced to shift their attention from troop movement outside; however, other Iraqi units in nearby buildings will be aware of the Coalition entry point. Thus, follow-up assault teams will be drawing fire as they move to reinforce the foothold.

The squads and platoons moving at street level will work in conjunction with mortar fire, which can be very effective both offensively and defensively. During MOUT, high-explosive mortars are used more heavily than any other indirect fire weapon.

Mortars have a short minimum range and provide a high rate of fire with a steep angle of fall that make them capable of focusing intense firepower on very specific positions. Mortar fire can also limit Iraqi fires and movement, allowing Coalition forces to move to an advantageous position in relative safety. At night, a synchronized use of ground-mounted antitank weapons, AH-1 attack helicopters, and mortars can illuminate and destroy hidden Iraqi forces or render them visible for ground forces attack.

The Prolonged Fight

In open warfare in the natural environment, time is a disadvantage. Commanders want to move forward rapidly to obtain decisive results. That is not the case on MOUT. The need for intelligence preparation of the battlefield, planning of tactics, techniques and procedures, and mobility planning all depend on a studied assessment and analysis. Once operations are underway, movement at street level must be plotted strategically to minimize casualties while obtaining footholds in key terrain.

Time, although it will inevitably bring additional casualties, can act in our favor in the battle of Bagdhad. As Coalition forces move forward through the city, Saddam will encounter increasing difficulties providing for the population. With an already high level of citizen dissatisfaction, this may lead to greater assistance from the local population both in providing cover and in revealing the location and routes of Iraqi forces remaining within the city.

Regardless, the one certainty in the upcoming urban battle for Baghdad is that we will see greater numbers of casualties, both among the Iraqis as well as our own forces, than we have seen to date. Pressure to hasten the battle will only increase these losses on our part, a consequence we all want to avoid.

Thursday, March 27th, 2003, 11:29 pm   |   War Bites  |  RSS feed Comments and pings are currently closed.