Timeline: Iraq Between the Wars: 1991-2003

NOTE: Because many actions on Iraq’s part were not discovered until after the fact, this timeline has been pieced together from cumulative sources. Often only UNSCOM or UNMOVIC reported certain incidents, and then not until the next report was due (often a period of 5 months). In those situations, I extracted the information from report and put it into the appropriate location on the time line with a reference to the report from which it came. Please also note that this document was compiled in 2003. Reporting broken links would be greatly appreciated so I can maintain the integrity of the research. - VK

1991

•01/17/1991: Kuwait is liberated.

•03/01/1991: The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists reports that Iraq had primitive nuclear capabilities, and that for “several years Iraq had been pursuing the development of gas centrifuges, which use rapidly spinning rotors to separate the more desirable uranium 235 isotope from the more plentiful uranium 238 isotope.”

•04/03/1991: Security Council Resolution 687 instructs Iraq to provide full information on its weaponry and to disarm by destruction of all WMDs, ballistic missiles with range exceeding 150km and accompanying production facilities. Iraq agrees and provides some information but denies having biological weapons.

•06/17/1991: Unscom and IAEA are given authority for inspections.

•06/23/1991: Unscom/IAEA inspectors try to intercept military vehicle bearing nuclear items. Iraqi soldiers fire shots. The equipment is later seized and destroyed.

•08/02/1991: Iraq acknowledges that it did have biological programs at one time.

•08/15/1991: Security Council Resolution 707 demands complete information on the biological program.

•09/21/1991: IAEA inspectors find numerous documents describing Iraq’s nuclear program. Iraqi soldiers grab some documents directly from the hands of an inspector. Iraq refuses to let the inspectors leave the site with the remaining items. The inspectors wait for 4-days at the site until the Security Council threatens action. Iraq relents and the inspectors are allowed to leave.

•10/11/1991: Resolution 715 orders ongoing inspections. Iraq declares it unlawful.

•10/25/1991: The Commission issues its first report claiming it has “sufficient information to have a general picture of Iraq’s capabilities and facilities in all the areas concerned.” In the nuclear field, IAEA inspections identified clandestine chemical, centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation as well as laboratory-scale plutonium separation for uranium enrichment. IAEA also found conclusive evidence of a nuclear weapons development site geared to produce an implosion-type nuclear weapon deliverable by surface-to-surface missile.

•12/17/1991: The Chairman’s second report on Iraq’s compliance with 687 says that Iraq is concealing information by hiding it or burying it in the desert. The report claims UNSCOM had seized and destroyed most of the hidden items, including documents on a nuclear program.

1992

•06/01/1992: No-fly zone created.

•06/16/1992: The Chairman of UNSCOM reports that Iraq is engaging in a systematic pattern of obstruction, concealment and interference, but progress is being made.

•07/06/1992: Inspectors want access to Iraq’s Agricultural Ministry building where they believe archives related to banned weapons are hidden. Iraq denies access until the Security Council calls it a material breach. Inspectors discover that Iraq moved the archives during the time their access was barred.

•12/17/1992: The Special Commission says in its 4th report that Iraq’s obstruction has increased, and that Iraq has willfully failed to provide full disclosures to date despite repeated requests.

1993

•01/1993: After Iraq refuses to let UNSCOM inspectors use their own planes, and makes incursions into both the no-fly zone and the DMZ between Iraq and Kuwait, Iraq is warned that this constitutes material breach. France, UK and US conduct air raids to penalize Iraq. Iraq allows UNSCOM to resume flights.

•06/21/1993: Iraq refuses UNSCOM to use cameras to monitor missile engine test stands. The Special Commission issues its 5th report finding that Iraq is only providing information it believes the Commission already knows and is concealing other information until caught in the act.

•11/05/1993: The Commission issues its 6th report which says Iraq’s has finally acknowledged its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and plans to meet its requirements of section C of resolution 687 (1991).

•12/21/1993: Iraq continues limiting camera monitoring. There have also been numerous attacks on the inspection teams. UNSCOM reports that increased cooperation should reduce the problems.

1994

•06/24/1994: UNSCOM says Iraq has begun to comply by destroying chemical warfare agents consisting over of 480,000 litres of chemical warfare agents (including mustard agent and the nerve agents sarin and tabun); 28,000 chemical munitions (involving 8 types of munitions ranging from rockets to artillery shells, bombs and ballistic missile warheads); and nearly 1,800,000 litres, 1,040,000 kilograms and 648 barrels of some 45 different precursor chemicals for the production of chemical warfare agents.

•10/15/1994: Iraq threatens no further cooperation with UNSCOM until the sanctions are lifted and also begins movement toward Kuwait. The US responds by deploying troops to Kuwait. Security Council passes Resolution 949 demanding full cooperation. Iraq withdraws forces.

1995

•04/11/1995: After Iraq provides the second “Full, Final and Complete” disclosures of its prohibited biological and chemical weapons programs, IAEA reports to the UN that it is confident that Iraq’s nuclear program components have been identified and destroyed.

•04/14/1995: The Oil-for-Food program is created.

•08/01/1995: Iraq provides third “Full, Final and Complete” disclosures concerning its biological weapons program.

•08/08/1995: Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, General Kamel, together with his brother and their families, seek asylum in Jordan. Iraq claims that Kamel unilaterally hid important information from UNSCOM and IAEA which was just discovered. Iraq withdraws its third Full, Final and Complete disclosure.

•08/17/1995: Iraq admits a far more extensive biological program than previously admitted, including the filling of biological warfare agents into 166 bombs and 25 Al Hussein missile warheads. Iraq also admits to having produced missiles with greater range than previously reported. Iraq provides UNSCOM and IAEA with over 500,000 pages of documents which had been secreted on a chicken farm, purportedly owned by General Kamel. The documents include information concerning production of VX and nuclear weapons.

•10/11/1995: UNSCOM reports that Iraq claims to have unilaterally destroyed banned items, knowing that UNSCOM can’t verify their destruction, for the purpose of disguising caches of weapons they are forbidding to possess. Due to this deception, the Chairman does not believe UNSCOM can make any accurate claims on Iraq’s disarmament status until re-evaluation of all prior UNSCOM reports and investigations.

•11/1995: Iraq provides second Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its missile program. Jordan intercepts a large shipment of high-grade missile components heading for Iraq. Iraq denies that it sought to purchase them. UNSCOM investigation reveals that Iraq has been attempting to acquire guidance and control components for banned missiles.

•12/17/1995: UNSCOM reports receipt of documents from Iraq has sped up inspections, but there is still inadequate information on Iraq’s production of VX and UNSCOM believes there is still undisclosed information on biological, chemical, and missile programs. The Chairman of UNSCOM recommends a mechanism to carry out monitor Iraq’s exports and imports to prevent Iraq’s acquisition of items needed to create WMDs.

1996

•02/1996: Saddam Hussein pardons General Kamel and his brother, along with their families, and says they may return to Iraq. They are shot days after their return by their wives, according to the government-owned media. The wives are also reported to have died.

•03/1996: Iraq denies UNSCOM teams access to five sites for periods up to 17 hours.

•03/27/1996: Security Council passes Resolution 1051 approving an export/import mechanism that allows UNSCOM to monitor Iraq’s traffic in items potentially related to banned weaponry.

•04/11/1996: UNSCOM Chairman reports that the majority of chemical and biological weapons have been destroyed, although a small but significant amount remains.

•05/1996 to 06/1996: UNSCOM supervises destruction of Al-Hakam, Iraq’s primary site for producing bio-warfare agent.

•06/12/1996: After admitting that certain locations were involved in concealing banned items, Iraq bars UNSCOM’s access to those sites. Security Council Resolution 1060 terms this a clear breach of prior resolutions.

•06/13/1996: Iraq denies another team access.

•06/14/1996: The president of the Security Council issues a statement deploring and condemning Iraq’s actions. The UNSCOM Chairman plans to visit Baghdad to obtain access to sites.

•06/19/1996: In Baghdad, the Chairman works out an agreement for access.

•08/23/1996: Statement by the President of the Security Council expresses grave concern over Iraq’s non-compliance with resolution 1060 (1996) which constitutes a gross violation of its obligations. The Council reminds Iraq that only full compliance enables the Executive Chairman to recommend lifting the sanctions.

•11/1996: Iraq prevents UNSCOM from removing missile engine pieces for analysis.

•12/1996: Iraq allows removal of the missile engines.

•12/30/1996: President of the Security Council issues a Statement condemning Iraq’s non-compliance with UNSCOM’s removal of the missile engines.

1997

•04/11/1997: The Commission issues its semi-annual report which notes Iraq’s continued concealment but that substantial progress has still been made.

•06/1997: Iraq again blocks UNSCOM teams from entering designated inspection sites and interferes with UNSCOM’s helicopter operations, endangering the safety of the craft and crews.

•06/18/1997: Statement by the President of the Security Council demands that Iraq permit UNSCOM to carry out its air operations without interference.

•06/21/1997: The Security Council passes Resolution 1115 demanding immediate and unfettered access to sites for inspection.

•09/1997: Iraq provides fifth Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of biological weapons programs.

•08/13/1997: A UNSCOM inspector is assaulted while photographing unauthorized movement in a site that Iraq has been barring.

•08/15/1997: Unauthorized movement is noticed at a second barred site.

•08/17/1997: The President of the Security Council makes a statement deploring the incidents and urging cooperation. Other inspectors, attempting to enter a site blocked by Iraq, take video of files being moved, documents being burned and ashes being dumped into a nearby river. Inspectors are denied access to three more sites deemed “Presidential sites.”

•10/06/1997: The Commission issues its semi-annual report containing a unanimous finding that Iraq, despite the number of documents recently disclosed, has still not come forward on all of its biological weapons programs. The report claims important progress but acknowledges significant difficulties due to Iraq’s deception.

•10/23/1997: Security Council Resolution 1134 demands full cooperation and implies further sanctions upon failure to comply.

•10/1997: UNSCOM completes destruction of a large quantity of chemical weapons that Iraq had previously denied having.

•10/27/1997: UNSCOM Chairman writes to Deputy Prime Minister Aziz of Iraq and proposes that Iraq address outstanding issues, including warheads, VX and biological weapons.

•10/29/1997: Aziz refuses to cooperate with US members of UNSCOM and demands that all such members leave Iraq. The President of the Security Council issues a statement demanding full cooperation or the imposition of serious consequences.

•10/31/1997: IAEA suspends activities.

•11/12/1997: Resolution 1137 condemns Iraq’s continued violation of its obligations and imposes a travel ban to penalize Iraqi officials involved with non-compliance.

•11/13/1997: Iraq orders US nationals working for UNSCOM to leave immediately. The Chairman decides all UNSCOM personnel should leave and the President of the Security Council issues a statement condemning the action.

•11/20/1997: Negotiations between the UN, Iraq and the Russian Federation result in an agreement allowing the inspectors to return.

•11/21/1997: An Emergency Session discusses ways to make the inspections more efficient. The session concludes there is no evidence of nuclear activity but notes a systematic effort to conceal, obstruct and restrict information to interfere with UNSCOM’s investigation. Two missiles, numerous chemical and biological delivery warheads, and chemical munitions are unaccounted for. UNSCOM is also awaiting updated information on the newly-disclosed biowarfare program.

•12/1997: Iraq blocks access to more sites.

•12/17/1997: UNSCOM Chairman a reports that Iraq is blocking access to the sites by claiming they relate to national security or are Presidential Palaces or foreign ministries.

1998

•01/12/1998 Jan.: Inspection teams are allowed to return. The very next day, Iraq withdraws cooperation on the grounds that too many of the teams’ personnel are of US or UK nationality.

•1/14/1998: The President of the Security Council issues a statement calling Iraq’s actions unacceptable and a clear violation of its obligations.

•01/22/1998: UNSCOM Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq to discuss the lack of access. Nothing is resolved.

•01/15/1998: IAEA reports that Iraq continues to provide insufficient answers about its clandestine nuclear program. As an example, IAEA says Iraq once indicated that a committee operated the nuclear program but in the next inspection denied having said this. IAEA says the concealment and deception prevent it from verifying Iraq’s claims to have terminated its nuclear program.

•01/15/1998: A report from the Technical Evaluation Meeting (TEM) states Iraq has acknowledged producing 3.9 tons of VX and having 758 tons of the VX precursor choline. Iraq claims the VX was destroyed and that the majority of the precursor was degraded and thus disposed of. The TEM concluds that Iraq still has the ability and materials to produce VX despite Iraq’s claims. The TEM also determines that Iraq has the ability to weaponize VX using weapons qualified for CW use. The TEM was unwilling to state that Iraq no longer possessed or was no longer manufacturing VX.

•02/25/1998: Kofi Annan enlists the aid of Russian foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, to add pressure on Baghdad while 30 ships and more than 300 US and British warplanes were poised in the Gulf. Annan and Saddam Hussein reach an agreement for Iraq’s acceptance of all resolutions without reserve and for UNSCOM and IAEA to receive immediate, full access to all sites.

•02/27/1998: A technical team is immediately dispatched to survey the Presidential sites.

•03/02/1998: Security Council Resolution 1154 adopts the Memo of Understanding.

•03/20/1998: The Commission and Iraq conduct a TEM in Vienna addressing Iraq’s biological weapons program.

•04/08/1998: Experts on the biological TEM report that Iraq continues to be deceptive about its biological weapons.

•04/15/1998: UNSCOM’s Special Group reports visiting 8 previously restricted Presidential sites with no significant problems.

•03/27/1998: UNSCOM Chairman, having met with Deputy Prime Minister Aziz, issues his report that Iraq has not provided adequate information concerning chemical weapons, and that Iraq appears to still possess the ability to make VX. Aziz challenges the latter finding, and the two sides agree not to discuss biological weaponry until their meeting in Vienna later in the year.

•04/16/1998: The Commission issues it’s semi-annual consolidated report stating that Iraq has never fulfilled the primary obligation to provide complete and verifiable declarations in any of the weapons areas specified by Resolution 687 (1991).

•04/09/1998: IAEA reports that Iraq has finally provided all information on its clandestine nuclear program and, although 170 attempts to import questionable materials were discovered in the past 4 months, only two proved to be banned items. The IAEA believes Iraq has divulged all information concerning its nuclear abilities.

•06/03/1998: UNSCOM Chairman makes a presentation to the UNSC indicating Iraq has declared its uniltateral destruction of 38,000 banned weapons but, in fact, retained 46,000. The Chairman emphasizes the “magnitude” of the banned items Iraq retained: 2/3 of its operational missile force, more than 1/2 of its chemical weapons, and all of its biological weapons. He notes “evidence of a systematic, centrally controlled mechanism within Iraq, tasked with concealing material and activity proscribed by Security Council resolutions” and emphasizes that these patterns are particularly important because Iraq is currently demanding lifting of sanctions.

•06/17/1998: UNSCOM Chairman says that as a result of his meetings with Aziz, he expects to resolve remaining priority disarmament issues within next two months. Iraq refuses to discuss its attempts at VX production any further and claims that its biological warfare program has been obliterated so it has nothing else to add to previous reports.

•08/03/1998: Deputy Prime Minister Aziz tells the UNSCOM Chairman that he must certify Iraq’s compliance with Resolution 687(c) (1991). When the Chairman refuses, Aziz suspends the talks.

•08/05/1998: Revolutionary Command Council and Ba’ath Party Command stop cooperating with UNSCOM and IAEA until the oil embargo is lifted and the Commission moves out of Iraq. Until then, Iraq is willing to permit ongoing inspections only on its own terms.

•08/05/1998: UNSCOM reports that it cannot verify Iraq’s disarmament without receiving full, candid and complete information. Aziz claims that UNSCOM is intentionally confusing issues to avoid lifting sanctions.

•08/06/1998: Security Council President, after being briefed by the Executive Chairman calls Iraq’s actions “totally unacceptable.”

•08/19/1998: The Executive Chairman proposes that Iraq and the Special Commission resume the full range of activity. Aziz rejects the suggestion and remarks that Iraq does not trust the Executive Chairman or the elements dominating UNSCOM and does not believe resuming work with them would be fruitful.

•09/03/1998: The Executive Chairman briefs the Council of three separate incidents of further limits Iraq has imposed on UNSCOM’s monitoring efforts.

•09/09/1998: Security Council Resolution 1194 unanimously condemns Iraq’s failure to cooperate and demands compliance. The Council says it will not review the sanctions until Iraq complies to UNSCOM’s satisfaction.

•10/13/1998: UNSCOM Chairman reports disarmament of missiles and chemical weapons is nearly complete, but not biological weapons. Iraq continues to permitting monitoring at a less than satisfactory level. Full disclosure was still being awaited.

•10/1998: Khidhir Hamza, the senior scientist whom Iraq accused of master-minding the country’s nuclear program along with General Kamel, publishes an article detailing the various ways in which Iraq was deceiving IAEA/UNSCOM on its nuclear abilities.

•10/31/1998: Iraq announces ceases all forms of interaction with UNSCOM, including monitoring. The Security Council issues a statement unanimously condemning this decision.

•11/05/1998: Security Council passes Resolution 1205 condemning Iraq’s actions. Less than 2 weeks later, Iraq states it will cooperate fully.

•11/24/1998: The Oil-for-Food program is renewed.

•12/15/1998: UNSCOM Chairman concludes Iraq is still not cooperating. The Special Commission withdraws its staff from Iraq.

•12/17/1998: Operation “Desert Fox” begins as US and UK planes conduct 4-days of air strikes.

1999

•01/1999: UNSCOM’s final compendium to the Security Council says that UNSCOM has discovered warheads containing degraded VX, which contradicts Iraq’s claims it had never filled warheads with nerve agents. Iraq has not provided any remnants of the 50 proscribed missile propellants it claimed to have unilaterally destroyed. Iraq has still not provided adequate information concerning its BW program, particularly the weaponization of produced BW agents and their acquisition. Still unaccounted for are the 550 shells filled with mustard gas that Iraq claimed were “lost” shortly after the Gulf War. (A dozen mustard-filled shells recovered in 1997 contained traces of mustard still of the highest quality.)

•04/09/1999: The Commission’s semi-annual report finds continued discrepancies between evidence of special missile warheads and Iraq’s claims to have destroyed them. No further chemical disarmament has been accomplished in the past 6 months because Iraq claims the chemical arms were destroyed but refuses to provide documents necessary for verification of this claim. The BW inspection team has also discovered documents concerning Iraq’s import of a growth media, a fact which Iraq has not previously disclosed. Iraq admits the import and later revises its stated balance of growth media. As a result of Iraq’s failure to provide adequate information, the Commission is unable to adequately report the state of Iraq’s disarmament.

•12/17/1999: Security Council Resolution 1284 replaces UNSCOM with UNMOVIC, reaffirms the previous resolutions and calls on Iraq to address humanitarian needs of vulnerable population groups. The resolution offers a trial period of 120 days under which sanctions would be lifted in exchange for full compliance, and a permanent end to the embargo would be considered upon demonstration of continuous movement toward disarmament.

2000

•03/01/2000: Hans Blix, appointed as Chair of UNMOVIC in January, says he’ll pursue aggressive inspections and “exploit” the documents gathered by UNSCOM but claims it is too early for him to express any opinion on Iraq’s disarmament.

•06/01/2000: Although no inspections were taking place, UNMOVIC trains personnel and logs notices from other countries on items shipped to Iraq which could fall under the dual-use category for Monitoring Export/Import.

2001

•02/16/2001: US and UK conduct self-defense strikes after Iraq launches missiles at planes in the no-fly zone. Iraq does not recognize the no-fly zones and has been challenging the allied presence there since 1998.

•03/2001: Iraq’s IIS prepares a memorandum to Saddam Hussein recommending a “call to strike the presence and interests of America.”

•09/11/2001. We remember.

2002

•01/29/2002: In his State of the Union address, President Bush calls Iraq part of the “Axis of Evil.”

•05/15/2002: The UN unanimously votes to overhaul sanctions against Iraq to help speed humanitarian aid to Iraqi people.

•07/06/2002: Talks in Vienna between Iraq and the UN break down after the New York Times publishes US Pentagon plans for the invasion of Iraq.

•07/19/2002: Iraqi missiles fire again on US aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone. Coalition planes strike at a telecommunications site in response.

•08/02/2002: Iraq invites Blix to Baghdad for talks to establish the next stage of monitoring.

•09/12/2002: President Bush speaks to UN and lays out Iraq’s pattern of dishonoring 16 UN resolutions. The report refers to an Iraqi defector, interviewed by the NY Times in 2001, who claims to have visited over 20 secret chemical, biological and nuclear facilities in Iraq and who has supported his claims with documents. Bush asks the UN whether it will serve its purpose or become irrelevant.

•09/17/2002: Iraq’s Foreign Affairs Minister writes to Kofi Annan and indicates that Iraq will allow UN weapons inspectors to return without conditions.

•09/19/2002: UNMOVIC proposes a time-table of inspections spreading over approximately 4-6 months.

•09/24/2002: Tony Blair presents a dossier claiming that new intelligence sources indicate Iraq can produce both nuclear weapons and WMDs.

•09/27/2002: US says an al-Qaeda suspect in custody indicates that Iraq has been allowing the group to train there and has provided them with chemical weapons training.

•10/02/2002: US says that because of Iraq’s history of deception and interfering with inspections, it will not agree to a UN resolution lacking a provision for with military force in the event of non-compliance. At the same time, Iraq and UN officials meet in Vienna to discuss the arrival of inspectors in 2 weeks. They reach an agreement for inspections to resume immediately without conditions and Iraq produces 4 CD-ROMs containing a backlog of monitoring information from the time when UN inspectors were blocked from entering Iraq. Blix indicates that Iraq is only now ready to accept resolution 1284 and the inspections.

•10/11/2002: The US and UK accuse Ukraine of selling a sophisticated tracking system to Iraq. Kiev denies sale.

•11/08/2002: The UN unanimously approves Resolution 1441 instructing Iraq to let inspectors return or face the prospect of war. France claims that a breach requires further consideration, while the US says that a breach will lead to disarmament by force. The resolution is worded vaguely enough to imply a compromise in which inspectors will be involved in determining if there is a “material breach.”

•11/25/2002: Blix prepares to lead teams of inspectors to Iraq.

•12/03/2002: Iraq says it is “devoid of weapons of mass destruction” and will submit its weapon report early.

•12/05/2002: UN Extends the Oil-For-Food program.

•12/07/2002: Iraq’s report exceeds 12,000 pages on its biological, chemical, WMD and missile programs and is a mixture of English and Arabic which needs translation. Saddam Hussein appears on t.v. the same night and issues a qualified apology to Kuwait for invading their country in 1990, then calls for Kuwaitis to join him in resisting “oppressive invaders.”

•12/09/2002: Iraq admits it came close to possessing nuclear technology, but insists it does not have any nuclear weapons now.

•12/18/2002: England finds omissions in Iraq’s declaration which it calls a “material breach” of the UN resolution.

•12/19/2002: Blix issues his first report which has mixed views. He refuses to say whether Iraq possesses WMDs until UNMOVIC has reviewed the latest documents from Iraq. He admits that those documents appear to be merely reworkings of the same ones submitted in 1996. Blix says Iraq has disclosed its development of the Al Samoud missile and a variant that exceeds the permissible range. He notes that Iraq pointed out this fact and has explained it developed the missile when it was disputing UNSCOM’s definition of its obligations. Blix says the issue will now need to be considered. Blix also notes that several questions remain unanswered, particularly about the existence of 500 mustard gas shells and the production and weaponization of VX. Blix states that UNMOVIC documents contradict Iraq’s account of its production and unilateral destruction of anthrax in 1988 and 1991, and Iraq’s account may not be accurate.

2003

•01/06/2003: Saddam calls UNMOVIC inspectors “spies.”

•01/09/2003: US argues that the missile engine used to modify Al Samoud variant is banned and constitutes a breach. US shares its intelligence reports on Iraq with Blix. Afterwards, Blix tells the press that Iraq hasn’t answered all of the questions. Blix also says Iraq has disregarded resolutions failed to adequately disclose information but says there is no “smoking gun” proving that Iraq is a threat.

•01/17/2003: Inspectors find 12 empty warheads, all in excellent condition, which are designed to carry chemical weapons in a complex of military bunkers. Iraq claims it forgot about them, while the US and UK call the discovery the “smoking gun.”

•01/18/2003: The Saudi government offers Saddam Hussein exile to avert war.

•01/19/2003: Iraq announces it has found 4 more empty warheads in unopened boxes. Inspectors locate 3,000 pages of documents written in Arabic that apparently relate to laser-enrichment technology.

•01/20/2003: UNMOVIC/IAEA issue a joint statement saying that Iraq been helpful producing other documents and looking for other undiscovered weapons, and that they have reached an agreement with Iraq to allow inspectors private interview with six scientists, although all six said they would not speak without Iraqi officials present. Blix says he expects continued cooperation.

•01/20/2003: The US offers Hussein immunity from prosecution if he will accept exile.

•01/24/2003: The US reveals that in September 2002 Iraq purchased aluminum tubes suitable for use as components in an uranium enrichment system, which is proof of Iraq’s continued clandestine nuclear program.

•01/27/2003: Blix says Iraq is cooperating but acknowledges a few problems which he believes will be worked out.

•01/29/2003: France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg delay plans to send planes to guard Turkey in the event of war with Iraq because it is too early to consider military force.

•02/07/2003: Powell gives a 70-minute multi-media presentation documenting that Iraq spied on UN Inspectors, that Iraq has long-standing links with al-Qaeda, and that numerous photos, show Iraq is “cleaning” items related to chemical weapons and disguising the removal of “nerve agents.”

•02/08/2003: The UK admits a dossier presented last month on Iraq’s intelligence network was largely lifted from other sources, but points out that this error does not invalidate its accuracy.

•02/09/2003: Iraq produces more documents for UN Inspectors’ review.

•02/14/2003: IAEA reports on its progress but says it needs additional time to review the recently produced documents. IAEA has reviewed the documents discovered in January concerning laser-enrichment technology and concluded that they were personal notes of the scientist in whose home the documents were found. IAEA points out that Iraq has still not provided information regarding weapon and centrifuge design which was requested in 1998.

•02/14/2003: Blix gives his report to the UN finding that disarmament has been very limited so far due to Iraq’s past behavior, but Iraq is now cooperating. There are still unanswered questions, such as the whereabouts of 1,000 tons of chemical agents that have not been accounted for and the VX and anthrax mentioned in his last report.

•02/24/2003: Blix tells Iraq to destroy its 100-120 Al Samoud-2 missiles by March 1 because they exceed the limits in UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). They must also eliminate their design data and equipment to build the missiles.

•02/27/2003: UN Inspectors say they have not found long-range missiles in Iraq.

•02/28/2003: Saddam Hussein says he agrees “in theory” with Blix’s directions, but he has still not provided information on the VX and anthrax.

•03/03/2003: Iraq says it is continuing to destroy missiles. The UN says Iraq will hand over documents concerning its destruction of the VX and anthrax supplies.

•03/06/2003: France, Russia and Germany vow they will not allow a UN resolution authorizing the use of force.

•03/07/2003: El Baradei, Director of the IAEA, reports there is no evidence of Iraq having nuclear abilities and that Iraq claims the aluminum tubes they ordered in September are for rockets. An allegation was raised that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger, but the IAEA believes Iraq’s explanation that one of its’ diplomats visits in Africa gave rise to these misimpressions. IAEA has examined the correspondence between the countries and conducted interviews and believes the allegations are false.

•03/07/2003: Blix reports to the UN that issues with aerial surveillance have been worked out and the teams have been able to conduct no-notice inspections without resistance. He believes that Iraq has more documentation and could provide it but has refused to do so. Inspectors have found no evidence of clandestine operations or underground facilities. Since Iraq has recently provided more documents on the anthrax and VX, Blix believes that Iraq has finally determined to fully cooperate with inspections and urges more time for this.

•03/07/2003: The UK responds to Blix’s report by demanding a March 17 deadline for compliance.

•03/07/2003: Powell responds by pointing out how long Iraq has failed to provide complete documentation, and the 17 prior occasions Iraq has denied the existence of items that the teams later turned up. Powell says there is no reason to believe that this pattern will ever end, and at some point Iraq must be disarmed by force if it will not do so voluntarily.

•03/07/2003: Powell holds meetings with the allies on the upcoming resolution proposal. No-fly patrols hit Iraqi radar systems as thousands of leaflets are dropped warning Iraqis not to fire on coalition forces.

•03/08/2003: Iraq announces that it is destroying 6 more Al Samoud-2 missiles.

•03/08/2003: UN members prepare to vote on the authorization of force against Iraq.

•03/10/2003: Russia says it will veto any new resolution, and that there is no need to use force. The US indicates it might accept changes to the proposal if provided the changes lead to disarming Iraq.

•03/11/2003: The U.N. releases Blix’s report which details extensive Iraqi activity to develop chemical and biological agent delivery systems. The report specifically notes that Iraq has drone aircraft that may be capable of delivering banned weapons, and that inspectors had discovered components for a 122 mm cluster bomb designed for chemical or biological warfare. According to Blix, Iraq claims the components were left over from an abandoned program. The cluster bombs are banned weaponry for Iraq and were not mentioned on its latest disclosures. Blix did not mention either issue in his verbal presentation to the UN.

•03/12/2003: Britain devises 6 steps Saddam Hussein must undertake to avoid war.

•03/13/2003: Bush aides claim Blix left out data in his report which showed that Iraq’s drone aircraft had a wing-span that greatly exceeding what Iraq stated in its latest Disclosure. Iraq claims the error was a typographical error and displays an airplane jerry-rigged from balsa wood, screws and duct tape which it claims it is for jamming radar and reconnaissance.

•03/14/2003: Iraq delivers a 20-page technical letter written in Arabic with information on its VX and anthrax programs. Iraq says the letter proves the destruction of approximately 1,000 tons of VX and 2,245 gallons of anthrax that had not been accounted for and that Iraq is clean of any WMDs.

•03/15/2003: Chirac says he will veto any resolution containing an ultimatum or involving the use of force.

•03/16/2003: US, UK and Spain hold the Azores Summit to discuss the upcoming vote. President Bush announces the “coalition of the willing” may not seek UN approval if it is will clearly be vetoed.

•03/15/2003: The UN says it is translating Iraq’s report and does not yet know what it says. Iraq asks Blix for a meeting to discuss disarmament issues.

•03/16/2003: Speaking at the summit, Bush says the crisis involving Iraq will reach its “moment of truth” in 24 hours.

•03/16/2003: Chirac insists inspections are working.

•03/17/2003: President Bush gives a televised speech telling Saddam Hussein and sons to leave Iraq within 48 hours or face military action. The President says that the UN has not lived up to its responsibilities in disarming Iraq, so we will live up to ours.

•03/17/2003: UN personnel leave Iraq in anticipation of military strikes. Saddam Hussein employs his Republican Guard and puts Iraq on military footing.

•03/17/2003: US intel reports that Iraqi troops are being armed with chemical munitions.

•03/18/2003: France says it may help in a chemical war. British Parliament gives Blair approval to pursue war. US intel monitoring Iraqi military communications believes that Iraqi troops south of Baghdad may have mustard gas and VX. Saddam Hussein appears in uniform on Iraqi TV for first time since Gulf War and announces that his country is ready.

•03/19/2003: Bush sends a letter to Congress authorizing the use of military force. US DOJ decides to detain Iraqis in the US who have been under surveillance due to suspicions they are members of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The detainees are considered to be sympathetic to Saddam Hussein and a threat to the US government. Hussein refuses to leave despite offers from Bahrain should he choose exile. Saddam Hussein’s 48 hours pass without his departure. President Bush cautions that there will be casualties despite hopes for a swift war. The US bombs Baghdad at approximately 5:30 a.m. (local time) after discovering a “target of opportunity.” President Bush addresses the nation to indicate that we are in the opening stages of military action.

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