As US forces near Baghdad, the concern about Iraq’s plans to use chemical weapons mounts. It is a known military tactic to use chemical attacks just prior to a weapons assault. Recently discovered evidence that Iraq is equipping its soldiers with chemical weapons protective gear points to the likelihood that Saddam is planning such tactics.
Precise information concerning Iraq’s chemical weapon arsenal is not available, in large part due to Iraq’s history of denying the existence of weapons that were later discovered in its possession. We do know much of the chemical arsenal that Iraq possessed at the close of the Gulf War has been destroyed during UNSCOM inspections. (For a detailed explanation of the disarmament process through UN inspections and Iraq’s resistance, see the the Timeline: Iraq Between the Wars.)
In 1994, Iraq began destroying over of 480,000 litres of chemical warfare agents (including the blister agent mustard gas and the nerve agents sarin and tabun); 28,000 chemical munitions (involving 8 types of munitions ranging from rockets to artillery shells, bombs and ballistic missile warheads); and nearly 1,800,000 litres, 1,040,000 kilograms and 648 barrels of some 45 different precursor chemicals for the production of chemical warfare agents.
By 1996, UNSCOM believed that Iraq had destroyed all but a small, yet significant, portion of its chemical weapons. Shortly thereafter, Iraq admitted that several previously undisclosed facilities had been used to manufacture proscribed weapons, leading the UN to find that Iraq was breaching its obligation to disarm.
In 1997, UN inspectors expressed the urgency for an accurate clarification of and accounting for Iraq’s proscribed missiles, including seven missiles claimed to have been for training, together with conventional warheads and warheads for biological and chemical agents, and major missile parts.
In 1998, Iraq acknowledged producing 3.9 tons of VX and having 758 tons of the VX precursor choline. Although Iraq claimed that the VX was destroyed and that the majority of the precursor was degraded and disposed of, a UN Board sitting in a Technical Evaluation Meeting concluded that Iraq retained the ability and materials to produce VX, and to weaponize VX using weapons qualified for CW use.
As to Iraq’s claimed deterioration of its mustard gas supplies, Iraq initially claimed production of 3,080 tons of mustard gas but later revised this figure downward to 2,850 tons. UNSCOM believes this may be part of Iraq’s pattern of underrepoting proscribed weapons in order to retain possession of them.
Moreover, in contradiction of Iraq’s claims, UNSCOM found that Iraq’s mustard gas was at least 80% pure and of sufficient quality for long-term storage, both in bulk and in weaponized form, without suffering deterioration. Iraq admits filling some 550 artillery shells with mustard gas but says it misplaced them shortly after the Gulf War.
However, even the UN inspectors remain convinced that Iraq had retained many chemical weapons which were neither disclosed as required by UN resolutions, or which were misreported.
After Iraq backed out of the disarmament process and forced UN inspectors to leave in 1999, the Chairman of UNSCOM reported to the UN Security Council:
1. Inspectors had discovered warheads containing degraded VX in contradiction of Iraq’s claims that it had never filled warheads with nerve agents.
2. Iraq had not provided any remnants of the 50 proscribed missile propellants it claimed to have unilaterally destroyed.
3. Iraq had still not provided adequate information concerning its biological weapons (BW) program, particularly the weaponization of produced BW agents and their acquisition.
4. Iraq had never accounted for the 550 shells filled with mustard gas that it claimed were “lost” shortly after the Gulf War.
5. Over 15,000 artillery rockets – Iraq’s preferred method for delivering chemical weapons based on past deployment – are also unaccounted for.
Last month, Hans Blix, current UNMOVIC Chairman, submitted a 12,000 page report detailing extensive Iraqi activity to develop chemical and biological agent delivery systems. The report specifically noted Iraq’s development of drone aircraft that may be capable of delivering banned weapons, and that inspectors had discovered components for a 122 mm cluster bomb designed for chemical or biological warfare. According to Blix, Iraq claims the components were left over from an abandoned program.
The perception that Iraq will use chemical weapons is based not only on this long-standing, extensive pattern of deception, but also on Iraq’s past use of such weapons during the Iran-Iraq war and against Iraqi Kurds.
In particular, the US believes that Iraq has never ceased its chemical weapons program. Rather, Baghdad appears to have disguised its program within its chemical industries by hiding manufacturing within civilian plants and by claiming that imported dual-use proscribed material was for civilian, not military, use.
For example, Iraqi civilian chemical plants manufacture chlorine and phenol, and both of which have legitimate civilian uses. Chlorine, for instance, is used for water treatment. However, both chlorine and phenol are also used in synthesizing precursors necessary for the production of blister and nerve agents.
Moreover, Iraq has an overabundance of plants allegedly dedicated to water treatment. So many, in fact, that three alone are sufficient to meet the country’s needs for water treatment. Of the 15 million kg of chlorine imported under the UN Oil-for-Food Program since 1997, Baghdad used only 10 million kg and has 5 million kg in storage. This is a strong indicator that Iraq is diverting domestically produced chlorine to chemical weapon production.
Mustard Gas
Iraq’s production of mustard gas arose in the 1980s. Mustard gas is actually a colorless, odorless liquid that does not transform immediately into gas if released at ordinary temperatures. When mixed with other chemicals, mustard gas turns brown and has an odor of garlic.
Mustard gas is a blister agent which causes symptoms of skin and eye blistering and lung irritation to the point that heavy exposure causes the lungs to fill with fluid and the victim “drowns.” These effects are exacerbated in hot, humid climates.
Saddam Hussein has used mustard gas previously when he attacked Iraqi Kurds living in Halabja, sixteen years ago this month on a day now known as “Bloody Friday.” The attack immediately killed 5,000 Kurds and injured another 10,000. As long-term effects have manifested, doctors have discovered nearly another 5,000 more who suffer injuries related to the chemical exposure.
Sarin (aka GB)
Considered one of the world’s most dangerous chemical weapons, Sarin is a synthesized liquid which vaporizes at room temperature. Initial symptoms include a runny nose, excessive saliva, difficulty breathing, vomiting, convulsions and loss of bowel control. Because Sarin acts on the central nervous system by overstimulating organs and muscles, it can rapidly cause paralysis of the muscles surrounding the lungs and the muscles of the legs. Five hundred times more powerful than cyanide, one drop of Sarin can kill the average person within minutes.
Saddam Hussein is known to have used sarin during the 1987 attack on Kurds at Anfal, which experts believe is only one of over 280 similar attacks by Saddam on the Kurds.
Although there is no evidence that Saddam used sarin on US forces in the Gulf War, doctors have found that the symptoms of “Gulf War Syndrome” are consistent with sarin exposure. It is assumed that such exposure could have occurred in the destruction of Iraq’s many chemical munitions dumps.
Iraq weaponizes chemical weapons using the “binary system” in which components are stored separately until use. Iraq’s preferred method is to deliver the chemical agents in multi-chambered rockets so that the contents combine upon the rocket’s impact. This has proven particularly effective for Iraq’s use of Sarin, the components of which are DF 2 and the alcohols cyclohexanol and isoproponal. Iraq’s DF 2 has been tested at a purity of 95%, and its imported alcohols have 100% purity. When combined, these components produce relatively pure sarin which vaporizes almost immediately.
Tabun (aka GA) and Soman (aka GD)
Clear, colorless liquids with a fruity flavor, Tabun and Soman both vaporize with exposure to heat. They are synthesized chemicals which mix easily with water, making them ideal for use in poisoning public water supplies without detection. Once released into water, vitims would continue to be exposed not only by drinking but by water used to wash their skin and food. Clothing exposed to Tabun can release the vapor for another 30 minutes, leading to the exposure of others as well as the wearer.
Like all nerve agents, Tabun and Soman act on the central nervous system by overstimulating the muscles and major organs until they can no longer sustain breathing and the victim suffocates. Since these chemicals are not readily metabolized, repeated exposures at even the smallest levels can have a cumulative effect. Symptoms appear within seconds of exposure and include runny nose, watery eyes, confusion, vomiting, weakness, blurred vision, pinpoint pupils, increased urination, and altered heart rate and blood pressure. Higher levels of exposure lead to loss of consciousness, convulsions, paralysis and respiratory failure.
Iraq began producing Tabun in 1984, although it claimed that it resulted in a chemical of poor and unstable quality such that it became ineffective shortly after production.
The first known use of Tabun worldwide was Iraq’s use in 1984 during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq continued its repeated use until 1988.
Because Iraq prefers to use warheads and rockets to deliver nerve agents, the January 2003 discovery of 12 such warheads is of particular concern, although Iraq claims that it merely “forgot” about the warheads.
Iraq initially estimated it had produced 250 tons of tabun and 812 tons of sarin but later reduced this to 210 tons of tabun and 790 tons of sarin. Thus, it is still uncertain how much tabun and sarin Iraq actually manufactured.
VX
The most toxic of known chemicals ever created, VX is both more dangerous and toxic than Sarin or Tabun. In its liquid form, VX is absorbed through the eyes or skin and can take up to 18 hours to produce symptoms common to all nerve agents, including watery eyes, runny nose, difficulty breathing, nausea, abdominal pain, blurred vision, and altered heart rate and blood pressure. In its vaporous form, VX takes effect almost immediately, producing a pronounced suffering that brings swift death.
VX came into Iraq’s arsenal in 1985. However, Iraq did not acknowledge its production until 1995 when confronted by UNSCOM following the defection of Saddam’s brother-in-law, who subsequently admitted to the country’s chemical weapons plans. Subsequently, Iraq evaded UN requests for additional information on its VX production, and what documentation it did provide proved inadequate and incomplete.
In 1998, a group of experts evaluating Iraq’s chemical weapons capabilities on behalf of the UN declared that it was unable to rule out the possibility that Iraq had maintained or was continuing to produce VX. The following year, UNSCOM discovered Iraqi warheads containing degraded VX, disproving Iraq’s prior claims it had never loaded the deadly agent into warheads. Although UNSCOM asked in 1999 for more documents pertaining to the weaponization of VX, Iraq did not provide them until earlier this month, when it produced a technical letter claiming that the country had destroyed its VX supplies. Because Iraq did not follow the UN Resolution procedures by allowing UN Inspectors to be present and monitor the destruction, there is no way to verify this claim. Given Iraq’s history of deception, particularly as to its VX program, there is no reason to believe the claim.
For the first 30 seconds after deployment of a weaponized chemical agent, the characteristics of the munition or delivery system determine the size and location of the initial area affected. After that, the disbursal patterns depend on variabls including wind, temperature, air stability, humidity and precipitation. In high temperatures such as those in Iraq, volatile agents will reach their maximum vapor in 15 seconds, although this can be lessened with strong winds.
Chemical agents released by a bursting weapon, such as a rocket or warhead, initially form a cloud that expands, growing both cooler and heavier while still maintaining its form. The buoyancy of the cloud, or height, is determined by the difference between the vapor density of the air and the vapor density of the cloud. The move dense the chemical cloud vapor, the more the cloud will flatten and sink toward the ground surface.
Shortly after release, the chemical cloud takes on the temperature of the surrounding air and moves along with its currents. Heavier clouds tend to retain their form and lethality longer, and in low turbulence the cloud can travel great distances without much decrease in its concentration.
Aerosol clouds act in much the same manner, although they are less affected by turbulence due to their heavier particles. These particles are capable of settling on surfaces and, depending on the chemical agent, maintaining toxicity long after cloud disbursement.
Chemicals used for their liquid effects quickly turn into vapor, with ground level impact directly influenced by the vapor’s density. Liquid agents with high vapor density undergo very little evaporation before reaching the ground surface, and are therefore referred to as persistent agents. Liquid agents can be soaked into a surface (absorbed), they may adhere to the surface (adsorbed) or they may evaporate into the air. Downwind concentrations of a liquid disbursement are not nearly as great as other forms of agents.
When dealing with the possibility of an offensive chemical weapons attack, Coalition forces focus on synchronizing operations to assist the attacked forces in breaking contact and repositioning. Decontamination sites are selected and established, and decontamination operations are conducted as needed for surviving the contact.
Assets are also focused on assisting the attacked units to withdraw and reposition by creating passage lanes allowing the contaminated elements to move without spreading the toxin. Protection is provided by attack on and distraction of enemy echelons to protect the passage lanes.
The US Military has a number of detective devices available to protect forces from the effects of chemical weapons. In addition to various medications which can be taken to “immunize” a soldier’s body against reaction to toxins such as Tabun or Soman, the forces also have mechanical alarms to alert them prior to exposure and permit the synchronization of operations described above.
The Chemical Agent Alarm (CAM) is one such device which acts as a vapor alarm, although it is limited by its ability to only detect vapors in front of its nozzle. Due to this limitation, recon forces survey the entire area with the CAM to properly assess the presence of chemical vapors.
Another limitation of the CAM – and one which may be particularly important in the battle for Baghdad given the fires following bomb raids – is the tendency for it to give false responses in response to aromatic vapors, cleaning compounds and smoke.
Automatic Chemical Agent Alarms (ACAA) are placed in position upwind when a unit arrives in an area and can remain stationary. When placed every 300 meters apart, the alarms are sensitive enough to warn against any vapor clouds passing between them. The number of alarms needed depends upon the size of the unit.
The USMC-issued Individual Chemical Agent Detector (ICAD) uses electrochemical sensors which can detect nerve agents like Sarin, Soman and Tabun, along with blister, blood and choking agents.
In particularly sandy or dusty environments, the ICAD requires frequent cleaning to ensure that its sensors have adequate exposure for toxin detection. Failure to keep an ICAD sufficiently clean can render it ineffective.
The ABC-M8 and M9 Chemical Agent Detection Paper react to the presence of chemical vapors in the air by changing colors at even the slightest amount of exposure. However, because the paper must be observed to warn of possible vapors, both the M8 and M9 are ineffective in the dark. Moreover, with the M9, color changes will not show up under a flashlight; a white light is required. During a night time operation, the potential for breaking operational security is often too great to employ M9.
M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit is issued to every squad and is used to verify results if a CAM alarm goes off. Like the M9 paper, however, it must be read with a white light and is therefore impractical for covert, nighttime operations.
The true height of military chemical detection is the FOX, a six wheel amphibious armoured cargo and tactical transport vehicle with a 320-horsepower V-8 engine that moves it at a maximum speed of 65 mph for a cruising range of 500 miles. Combat loaded, the FOX weighs 18.7 tons (16.9 without crew or ammo) and has a 40 mm smoke grenade launcher and M240E1, 7.62mm machine gun. Inside the FOX, the crew’s area is defended against contamination by a collective protection system.
Included in the defense/detection systems are a Mobile Mass Spectrometer (MM1) which is capable of identifying all known chemical agents. Also on board is Radiac Equipment (ASGI) composed of two probes in the exterior ports on which transmit to the radiation detection instruments inside the vehicle.
Intergrated with the MM1 and ASGI, the Vehicle Orientation System (VOS-25) uses gyroscopic motion and sensors to interpret a depiction of chemical contamination on the map and direct the FOX accordingly.
The FOX is capable of detecting nuclear, chemical and biological attacks. It is protected against electromagnetic pulses (EMPs), transi-radiation effects on electronics (TREE), and electronic countermeasure (ECM).
Given Saddam Hussein’s distinction as the only leader to have used sarin, soman and tabun in the past, it is not unreasonable to expect he may resort to such tactics again. Indeed, Iraqi officials have stated that they would not hesitate to use such weapons this time, either.
This was General Schwarzkopf’s fear in the Gulf War, although Saddam never did employ chemicals despite having an enormous stockpile and subsequent interrogation of Iraqi military officials confirms it was never considered an option. Experts believe that Saddam’s hand was stayed out of fear of the retaliatory action the US and other nations would exact had he resorted to chemical weapons during that war.
The times are different now, and Saddam is a different man. He is reported to be losing control of his country.
After 12 long years of UN inspections, he brought Iraq very close to having the sanctions lifted so that the country could begin to financially prosper again. Yet mere days into the war, Saddam himself proved that he had been deceiving the UN and the rest of the world throughout those 12 years when he fired proscribed SCUD missiles at Kuwait. After this act, even if the war were to end in a peace treaty, Iraq would remain under crippling sanctions for as long as Hussein remained in power.
With “no going back,” the Coalition’s fear now is that Saddam will opt for a dramatic death. He has often been heard to say that “Iraq is Saddam, and Saddam is Iraq.” So if Iraq’s people do, in fact, begin assisting the Coalition and rising up against Saddam, what is to stop Saddam from rising up against the Coalition and his own people by unleashing the most destructive forces known to man?
Wednesday, March 26th, 2003, 1:59 pm | 
War Bites | 
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